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In Forms of Modernity: Don Quixote and Modern Theories of the Novel, Rachel 
Schmidt employs a renewed concept of Romantic irony in order to resituate Immanuel 
Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ with respect to postmodern thought in a persuasive bid to 
reconfigure the genealogy of novelistic theory. By forging deep links between the 
historical predicaments of her chosen theorists and their evolving thought, Schmidt 
complicates and renews our appreciation for the multi-voiced writings of Schlegel, 
Lukács, Unamuno, Ortega y Gasset, and Bakhtin according to (neo)Kantian notions of 
cognition, judgment, and aesthetics. Schmidt’s study is also indicative of, and instructive 
for, the current proliferation of ‘scientific’ approaches to early modern cultural history, 
and Cervantes’s works in particular. From historiographical studies that reevaluate 
Spain’s role in the scientific revolution, to the reading of early modern literary texts 
through contemporary paradigms such as quantum mechanics or embodied cognition, we 
are witnessing increasingly diverse and contradictory attempts to bring Cervantes’s 
(post)modern aesthetic experiments to bear on modernity’s problematic and often violent 
relationship with science and technology.1 
A principal motive of historiographical studies like María M. Portuondo’s Secret 
Science: Spanish Cosmography and the New World is to ‘rescue’ Spain from the margins 
of modernity by underlining the robust—if decidedly pragmatic—production, traffic, and 
implementation of scientific literature, especially in the late sixteenth century.2 Taking a 
different tack, the so-called ‘cognitive turn’ considers Cervantes’s works through recent 
developments in Embodied Cognition and Theory of Mind, offering itself as a corrective 
of sorts to the panoply of ideological ‘–isms’ that sprang from Deconstruction and New 
Historicism.3 Curiously, this attempt to elide the ideological by focusing on mind-body-
environment matrices runs the risk of reviving scientific positivism just when Quantum 
Theory (QT), appears poised to overcome it.4 Due to its privileging of the contingent 
moment and matrices of observation and measurement in the production of scientific 
knowledge, QT seems to hold more promise, although the unavoidable anachronism 
proves difficult, but not impossible, to overcome in a field as philologically anchored as 
Golden Age literary studies. This, in spite of the rather obvious structural parallels 
between QT and early modern expressions of perspectivism, not to mention the historical 
coincidence of modern theories of the novel and the theory of relativity (Schmidt). The 
goal of the present study is to outline what a historically informed quantum approach to 
Cervantes’s Novelas ejemplares might look like.5 One advantage of this approach is that 
Spain’s so-called eccentricity, or otherness, with respect to the rise of modern science 
and its mechanistic and deterministic understanding of physical causality, becomes an 
ally rather than a liability. 
I will begin with the particular, and somewhat peculiar, scientific revolution that 
Schmidt places at the center of her study. What she means by ‘Copernican revolution’ 
with respect to Kant is not exactly what we have come to expect from more canonical 
approaches to the scientific revolution. Yes, the liberation of Earth from its subservient 
status within the Ptolemaic crystalline spheres leads to the questioning of the tenets of 
neo Scholastic determinism and the concomitant subversion of substantialist political and 
social hierarchies (Kuhn, Foucault, David Castillo and Lollini). And, yes, free will (libre 
albedrío) is given a compatibilist leg-up by theologians and philosophers such as Luis de 
Molina in an era that, not coincidentally, experiences aggressive attacks on political, 
intellectual, and even geographical exploration and experimentation (Feldhay).6 Schmidt 
glosses all of these commonplaces, but she does not dwell on them, because the goal of 
her philosophical discussion is the excavation, clarification, and projection of Kant’s 
categorical imperative as it relates not to the self per se, or its knowledge of the world, 
but instead to the subject’s moral imperative with respect to the Other: “The valorization 
of art corresponds to the ethical valorization of other human beings, according to basic 
worth or dignity (Würde)...and most importantly, judgment enables the individual to 
fulfill the Kantian moral imperative to treat others as ends and not as means” (125). Just 
as the untethering of Earth from its abject (meta)physical position within the medievally 
conceived Ecumene reorganizes the cosmos into something more akin to Gracián’s 
billiard table or Cervantes’s mesa de trucos,7 the relationship between the self and its 
knowledge of the world must now be mediated through its relationship with other 
subjects, all other subjects. Anticipating Leibniz, what we end up can only be mapped 
and tracked through a poetic calculus of infinite curves, or lines of convergence and 
escape (Gilles Deleuze, The Fold and A Thousand Plateaus). In short, we enter into 
paradigms of aesthetic and physical relativity.8 
My claim in this analysis of Cervantes’s novella La Gitanilla is that not only do 
each of Cervantes’s tragicomic heroes of romance, for example, reveal a unique 
trajectory, or set of discursive and ethical ‘worldtracks’;9 they are also better understood 
in and of themselves when they are placed in dialogic relation to other generic 
predicaments, or arguments, even or perhaps especially when such juxtapositions are not 
explicitly called for by the text. According to Schmidt, this is what Romantic irony 
consists of, as she amply demonstrates in her clever and dialogic analyses of the silences 
and excesses in the novelistic canon. This is especially the case in her analysis of Bakhtin, 
which argues that the Russian philosopher’s copious footnotes rub against the grain of the 
more ideologically and politically conservative body of his texts. According to Luis de 
Molina’s early modern writings on free will, authors such as Bakhtin (and Cervantes) 
cede protagonist roles to so-called ‘secondary’ influences, which, in turn, determine the 
direction of epistemological and ontological arguments in their texts. More on Molina 
later, but for now I would like to show how this implicit structural irony complicates the 
meaning(s) of a work like La Gitanilla.10 
There are a great number of puzzling parallelisms and juxtapositions in the 
opening romance of the Novelas ejemplares. For Avalle-Arce, Márquez-Villanueva, and 
Chad Gasta, this is because Cervantes is experimenting with more than one genre, 
including folkloric expressions, such as the poetic pulla (Márquez-Villanueva), and of 
course the picaresque. Although it is tempting to map a trajectory moving from the more 
vulgar world of the picaresque to the more refined plane of romance (Forcione, Avalle 
Arce, Clamurro, ter Horst), my arguments will follow the path laid down by George 
Güntert, who successfully links Cervantine irony to (post)modernity when he writes that 
“Lo característico del mundo cervantino no es, pues, la existencia de diferentes planos 
ontológicos (material-espiritual; temporal-permanente) sino su coexistencia y aun su 
compenetración y mezcla” (109). This is very close to what I mean by implicit structural 
irony, since what Güntert underlines is Cervantes’s dialogic as opposed to dialectical 
assemblage of fictional worlds. By contrast, studies by Casalduero, Forcione, Avalle-
Arce, Ter Horst, and Clamurro emphasize the dialectical movement from the mundane 
and chaotic towards a transcendental, or more authentic, resolution. I would argue that an 
analysis of Cervantes’s implicit structural irony can help explain why the abrupt and 
violent ending of La Gitanilla and other novellas that end in marriage leaves one with the 
sense that an opportunity has been lost (see Kartchner). A host of critics has tried to make 
sense of Preciosa’s loss of freedom and voice in generic, structural, narrative, or religious 
terms, but my claim here will be that the discerning reader is meant to resist the 
temptation to find redemption in Preciosa’s marriage and is led to dwell instead on the 
nonsensical closure of the piece. Indeed, my main argument will be that this nonsense is 
precisely where the Hispanic baroque’s contribution to the scientific revolution is most 
apparent, and problematic. 
A curious facet of La Gitanilla that has received relatively little attention concerns 
the fact that the reader is never given concrete knowledge or understanding of what 
Preciosa is thinking or what her ‘authentic’ desire might be. We know what she doesn’t 
believe—the gypsy patriarch’s ramblings concerning the worldview of the gypsies—, and 
we know what she doesn’t want—to be bought outright by a randy nobleman. However, 
we are never sure if the poems she sings are her own; nor is she herself even certain of 
where her own ingenious and timely interventions on jealousy or love originate. The 
closest we come to seeing into her soul is when she credits “un cierto espiritillo” with her 
tendency to hold forth on a surprising number of topics with no apparent previous 
schooling other than her upbringing with her gypsy grandmother. Gerli writes: “In the 
end, Preciosa's noble lineage is indeed revealed, but she proves noble not by reason of her 
parents' privileged social status, but by virtue of the ‘cierto espiritillo fantástico’ (p. 38) 
which shapes her values and her actions” (32). More confusing still are her repeated 
warnings not to take anything she says too seriously: “Y sepa que no sé nada de lo que 
digo, y no es maravilla que como hablo mucho y a bulto, acierte en alguna cosa” (94). 
Unlike the victimized heroines of honor intrigues in the comedia, Preciosa’s character is 
not given to soliloquial introspection or doubt, which removes any solid ground from 
beneath her theatrical performances. As Francisco Sánchez has argued: “La narrativa se 
convierte en un constante proceso de ruptura con la percepción teatral y, por consiguiente, 
con los propios registros mentales del individuo” (32). In sum, Preciosa ingeniously and 
stubbornly embodies what the rest of the characters participate in for their own ends: 
deception and deceit.  
Indeed, Preciosa explicitly states that her acceptance of Andrés’s advances was 
based on her own desire for personal medro, which would seem to reflect the picaresque 
education provided by the old gypsy grandmother rather than her ‘innate’ noble being 
(ser):  
Ella, con vergüenza y con los ojos en el suelo, le dijo que por haberse considerado gitana, y 
que mejoraba su suerte con casarse con un caballero de hábito y tan principal como don 
Juan de Cárcamo, y por haber visto por experiencia su buena condición y honestro trato, 
alguna vez le había mirado con ojos aficionados; pero que, en resolución, ya había dicho 
que no tenía otra voluntad que aquella que ellos quisiesen. (131) 
Her acceptance of the marriage proposal is couched in a gesture of absolute paternal 
obedience and relative silence, a silence that effects a radical change in her persistent, 
even excessive, garrulousness throughout the rest of the novella. Nevertheless, if we put 
all of these contradictions together, Preciosa’s actions can be read as a careful and clever 
navigation of the apparently contradictory patriarchal orders through which she moves.  
As for Andrés, lies, blood, and money mark his entry into and departure from the 
world of the gypsies. Both the adoption of the name Andrés and his common law 
betrothal to Preciosa are ritualistically consummated by the sacrifice and burial of his 
mule along with the trappings of his noble identity.11 (This whole scenario makes for an 
interesting contrast with Don Quixote’s resurrection of Rocinante and disinterment of the 
tarnished and rusty, Quesada/Quijada family armory.) Structurally, at least in terms of the 
loss or gain of identity, the prolonged negotiation of the beast’s fate and the grotesque 
description of its strangulation mirror the way in which Andrés is beaten when he is taken 
into custody by the authorities as well as Preciosa’s mother’s violent stripping of her 
estranged daughter in the search for the telltale birthmark under her left teta and her 
webbed toes.12 Also notable is the gypsy community’s assurances that Andrés, himself, 
would not recognize his own mula, once they finish disguising him, much as Preciosa 
goes unrecognized by her own parents, even after the grandmother shows them the infant 
jewelry, a clear reference to recognizable amulets and such in the romantic tradition (see 
Northrop Frye). An Augustinian reading might conclude that these scenes of 
misrecognition and recognition, respectively, signify Andrés’s entry into the comparably 
bestial cosmos of the gypsies, and Preciosa’s departure from the same. However, 
Andrés’s return to his ‘honorable’ self is punctuated by his murder of an officer of the 
law who punched him after he was taken into custody because of the false accusations of 
la Carducha; so there is violence at both forks in the road.13 The ritualistic nature of the 
violence and rhetoric of all of these scenes underlines the fundamental cognitive and 
social structures placed into dialogic play by Cervantes (Bell, Ritual Theory). 
Mediating and/or abetting all of these rituals is the conspicuous and excessive 
flow of currency. Preciosa and her back-up dancers are responsible for very overt 
exchanges symptomatic of early modern Spain’s incipient culture industry (Seiber, 
Maravall, Godzich and Spadaccini). Andrés, for his part, compensates the gypsies for the 
money they were hoping to get by disguising and selling his rented mule, all the while 
ostentatiously distributing gold to disguise his lack of larcenous aptitude and attitude. He 
is the mirror image of Preciosa in his duplicity.14 If there is a moment of what Victor 
Turner would call ritual communitas, in the pastoral songs of Andrés, Clemente, and 
Preciosa, it is only possible because the three nobles have been momentarily removed 
from their circulation in the Court (96). Thus, in the denouement of the novela, the family 
of the murdered lawman is placated with another 4,000 ducats from Andrés. And this is 
not the only case in which the institutions that are supposed to uphold the law succumb to 
bribes, or worse, encourage citizens to purchase their complicity, including the tiniente 
cura, who absurdly postpones the much anticipated wedding due to the families’ failure 
to provide the proper paperwork. Such scrupulousness after so many scruples have been 
abandoned, bought, sold, or simply ignored can only be seen as ironic. In his study on the 
Baroque public sphere in Spain, William Childers writes, “The status of any display of 
officially sanctioned qualities is radically undermined by the awareness that the same 
person who makes it may elsewhere be engaging in a partially hidden, but still public 
practice, with quite a different meaning” (169). This duplicitous circulations of bodies, 
money, and poetry speak to the generic collision between bourgeois-picaresque and 
aristocratic-romantic aesthetic codes. It also marks the spot where I will begin to link the 
scientific line of inquiry promised at the beginning of this essay with my analysis of the 
structural ironies that interrupt and magnify our enjoyment and confusion in La Gitanilla.  
In Lágrimas en la lluvia, Rosa Montero’s 2011 science fiction homage to Ridley 
Scott’s Bladerunner, the narrator follows Bruna Husky, a military replicante (rep) who 
has finished her obligatory tour of duty in intergalactic colonial wars and become a 
private investigator.15 As a manufactured good, Husky was required to fulfill her ‘organic’ 
functions for a number of years before being allowed to exercise self-determination. 
Montero’s novel provides a useful sounding board for La Gitanilla, whose plot seems to 
move in an opposite direction, from free will towards obligatory “service.” We meet 
Bruna post-servitude when, in classic Hitchcockian fashion, she becomes interpellated 
into a clandestine war between the species, which features a sinister attempt to rewrite the 
history of the world in a way that justifies the annihilation of the reps and all other 
“aliens.” More germane to this study is Bruna’s love-hate relationship with the memory 
software installed during her manufacture, which comes complete with a number of 
fetishistic objects through which her identity is cathected and reinforced. This ‘artificial’ 
memory motif becomes quite Cervantine, even Unamunian, when Bruna meets the author 
of her memory, a successful novelist named Pablo Nopal, who has been barred from the 
memorista profession due his alleged murder of his father.  
One of the more potent critical gestures in Lágrimas is the substantiation of the 
knowledge and self-consciousness of the manufactured other, who holds a privileged 
view of the unrestrained barbarity of the technocratic imperialism whose vanguard she 
was created to buttress and extend.16 Just as important is the desubstantiation of the 
assumed ontological distinction between the memory of Bruna and that of Nopal, who 
based his assemblage of Bruna’s childhood memories on his own damaged upbringing. 
The following exchange occurs between Bruna and her therapist, starting with the 
therapist: 
--Existe el amor que sientes por tu madre, por tu padre. 
--Mentira. 
--No, ese amor es real. Tu desesperación es real porque tu afecto es real. 
--Mi desesperación es real porque mi afecto es un espejismo... 
--El mío también. Todas las memorias son mentirosas. Todos nos inventamos el 
pasado. ¿Tú crees que mis padres fueron de verdad como yo los recuerdo hoy? 
--Mira... No puedes entenderlo. ¡Un humano no puede entenderlo! ... Nunca hemos 
sido verdaderamente únicos, verdaderamente necesarios para nadie... (153-54) 
Lágrimas challenges and eventually undoes the ontological exceptionalism at the heart of 
Bruna’s lament even as it underlines her historical specificity, reality, and, yes, necessity. 
In the end, this testing of the barrier between the ‘false’ memory, or dream world, and the 
‘real’ memory of the symbolic world should look very familiar to us, since it represents 
Cervantes’s and the Spanish Baroque’s most powerful commentary on and contribution 
to what Barrera-Osorio calls the “early scientific revolution”: “the commercial and 
empire-building culture of this period legitimized the new empirical practices of the new 
science.... Science is not always a neutral activity in pursuit of the truth but rather a 
political activity aimed at controlling nature” (8-11).17 It is the consciousness of the 
temporally contingent nature of truth and being that is awakened by the ontological 
confusion at the heart of Cervantes’s Novelas ejemplares. 
Returning to Preciosa, her personal history holds to the structure of the replicant 
in that her identity was stolen/fabricated at the beginning of the novella and seemingly 
anchored at the end. I would suggest, moreover, that the tokens and clothing kept by the 
gypsy grandmother introduce a memory structure that is every bit as problematic as Pablo 
Nopal’s endowment to Bruna of the mementos from his own childhood. The principal 
point of contact has to do with the role of free will. The gypsy woman, of course, steals 
Preciosa from her birth family and inculcates her into an alien worldtrack, that of the 
gypsies and (aesthetically) the picaresque. She also constructs a false memory for her and 
interpellates her into the role of gypsy maiden, complete with beguiling dance moves, an 
alluring singing voice, and pedestrian poetic abilities, which the adolescent girl 
supplements with the help of a page who sells/gives her sonnets seemingly for a song. 
Yet this false patrimony is what attracts the reader and, more importantly, what becomes 
the basis of the identity whose loss the reader laments when she is married at the end. 
When we first meet Preciosa, she is captivating the desire, passion, and money of 
aristocratic ‘patrons,’ who materially reward her ability to enflame their passions. There 
is a markedly mercenary aspect to her performances, which extends to the demands she 
places on Andrés. What is more, she seems to possess a native intelligence about matters 
of the heart that astonishes even her gypsy stepmother. Where does such knowledge and 
apparent wisdom come from?  
Her picaresque upbringing and ciencia poética are the obvious places to start, but 
I think we also need to add her specific experience as a woman who dances for money. In 
a currency-based economy, she knowingly ups her value as a commodity by appealing to 
a competing range and number of ‘clients’. In this light, her dissertation on ‘celos’ can be 
seen as a theoretical excursus on how commodity value is inflated and manipulated. Joan 
Ramón Resina observes: “Preciosa sabe muy bien que en la seducción triunfa el que 
disimula mejor el deseo e insiste menos en el goce. La dialectica de la libertad y la 
dependencia en los signos de la seducción y el deseo es comprendida a la perfección por 
algunas mujeres cervantinas” (272). Of course, we cannot come to these conclusions 
exclusively by analyzing her words, as she herself denies knowing completely what she is 
talking about, which once again calls into question the authenticity of her performances. 
What I am getting at is that, just as in the case of Bruna Husky, Preciosa’s identity and 
memory have a dreamlike quality that never really goes away. Neither the stripping of 
her body nor her betrothal and marriage to Juan de Cárcamo reveal the desire and thus the 
meaning behind her actions. In Kantian terms, Cervantes does not allow us to exercise 
any substantial knowledge vis-à-vis the other, which is quite possibly his most potent 
contribution to the Copernican revolution. What we encounter instead is one obstacle 
after another in the search for knowledge and understanding. Most frustrating of all is the 
fact that the most persistent and opaque obstacles are the very social and literary codes 
that promise to shed light on the meaning of Preciosa’s journey from nomadic gypsy girl 
to married noblewoman. Rather than comfortably situate her within her noble line, the 
courtship ritual revels in violence and subterfuge, all of it designed to elicit the good faith 
of the future husband and secure the voluntary obedience of the future wife. It is here 
where free will comes into the picture or, rather, refuses to enter the picture at all.  
Our understanding of free will in the Counter Reformation has been complicated 
by Rivka Feldhay’s observation that there are at least two paradigms of free will that 
compete for superiority and legitimacy. The more conservative model is defended by the 
Dominicans, who believed that God’s foreknowledge of man’s actions is absolute due to 
the fact that God’s knowledge and will must remain inseparable if his omnipotence is to 
be absolute (Feldhay 205). There is no room for multiple truths here, which would arise 
only if there were to appear a space of indetermination between divine knowledge and the 
exercise of divine will (Feldhay 179-80).  In contrast to the Dominicans, the Jesuits set 
out to situate God’s knowledge and will according to a temporal relationship in which the 
exercise of his will in the realization of a divine decree is postponed. Until such time as 
the decree is willed, God’s foreknowledge remains suspended: “Separate and prior to the 
decree, the Jesuits contended, God has ‘scientia media’ by which he knows with a certain 
and infallible knowledge man’s future acts, although these are not yet predestined by his 
will. To some degree, God’s voluntary decree is guided by his knowledge” (Felday 205). 
This ‘middle knowledge’ is where Molina’s philosophical innovations become most 
notable, and modern. Middle knowledge concerns all those possible worlds that come 
into existence when a propitious ‘occasion’ presents itself to a human actor, i.e., 
secondary agent. God has absolute knowledge of all the possibilities that may come about, 
depending on the decision of the secondary agent; but he does not have foreknowledge of 
which actual world will come into temporal existence. When an ‘occasion’ appears on 
the horizon, a large number of these possible worlds becomes apparent, but it is up to the 
free will of the choosing subject to decide which world will come into temporal 
existence.18 This is what happens when Andrés attempts to flee from the advances of La 
Carducha, who has offered herself to him much like the emblematic figure of Occasion 
herself: “Andrés, como discreto—determinó de poner tierra en medio y desviarse de 
aquella ocasión que el diablo le ofrecía” (123; my emphasis). What also becomes 
apparent in La Gitanilla, however, is that an individual subject’s decision/action is never 
all-determining but depends, in turn, on the ways in which other subjects react to, or 
anticipate, the same occasion. La Carducha anticipates Andrés’s flight and attempts to 
halt it through her subterfuge. 
Here is where I believe that quantum theory can shed some light on what is going 
on, both in Molina’s paradigm of free will and Cervantes’s novelistic experiments. 
According to Henry Stapp in The Mindful Universe, “The basic move in quantum theory 
is to shift, fundamentally, from the airy plane of high-level abstractions, such as the 
unseen precise trajectories of invisible elementary material particles, to the nitty-gritty 
realities of consciously chosen intentional actions and their experienced feedbacks, and to 
the theoretical specification of the mathematical procedures that allow us successfully to 
predict relationships among these empirical realities” (23).19 Missing from this 
explanation is the quasi-infinite number and complexity of possible relationships, given 
the equally infinite number of factors in play for any given ‘occasion.’ Moreover, it 
becomes immediately obvious that Cervantes’s aesthetic practice/theory goes beyond 
even quantum theory, because the idea of ‘consciously chosen intentional actions’ is 
extremely problematic in all of his works. I have gone to some lengths to underline how 
precarious this notion is in my analysis of the actions and words of Preciosa. The problem 
becomes much more concrete in El coloquio de los perros, when Cañizares speculates on 
whether she and her cohorts have congress (convites) with the Devil: 
Hay opinión que no vamos a unos convites sino con la fantasía en la cual nos representa el 
demonio las imágenes de todas aquellas cosas que después contamos que nos han sucedido. 
Otros dicen que no, sino que verdaderamente vamos en cuerpo y en ánima; y entrambas 
opiniones tengo para mí que son verdaderas, puesto que nosotras no sabemos cuándo 
vamos de una o de otra manera, porque todo lo que nos pasa en la fantasía es tan 
intensamente que no hay diferenciarlo de cuando vamos real y verdaderamente. (341-42) 
This limit on the extent to which the self can come to knowledge of its own phenomenal 
experience, let alone the world around it, is a central motif throughout Cervantes’s oeuvre 
and of the Spanish baroque itself.  
I think it is useful to consider the generic heterogeneity of Cervantes’s novellas in 
light of QT, in large part because of all of the critical work that has been done trying to 
tie the loose threads in Cervantes’s works together. Casalduero and Forcione have 
formulated the most grandiose attempts to bring his works to signifying closure by 
deploying universal religious paradigms. Yet their differing conclusions, much like the 
dispute between the Dominicans and the Jesuits, display significant impasses and 
conflicts inside of Catholicism itself. One thing that Molina’s clever if infuriating 
paradigm of free will makes clear is that just because an author brings a potentially 
subversive, untamed romantic relationship to a sacramental closure, we should not 
assume that the other potential endings in the story are not equally real in some absolute 
sense. The Jesuits defend that all of the potential decisions of secondary actors along with 
all of their potential ramifications, implications, etc., are equally real in the absolute sense 
of God’s omniscience. What God cannot anticipate is which world will come into 
temporal existence. Thus, Providence becomes a compromise, or alliance, between God 
and the secondary agent. And in Cervantes, secondary agents and their colliding 
worldtracks proliferate to an almost infinite degree. These secondary agents include, by 
necessity, the reader, who is the co-creator of the artifice and whatever truths are 
communicated therein. And if the reader feels a profound sense of loss at the silencing of 
Preciosa; or pleasure at the torture of Juan; or comedy in the procedural machinations of 
the priest, then some alternatively imagined, providential realities are coming into 
existence through that affective investment, as Bruna Husky’s psychoanalyst correctly 
observes. In the words of Julio Baena, “Were it not for the tears in the text, as well as for 
the Prologue and the very disposition of the novellas, the reader would have no choice 
but to follow the old conclusion that they are truly exemplary, even reactionary” (214). 
As it stands, however, and quite compatibly with what Stapp calls the current hegemonic 
scientific paradigm, the dialectic of guilt gives way to the dialogism of multiple and 
equally legitimate, self-creating others. 
 Similarly, Güntert endows the baroque author with godlike powers of creation: 
“Cervantes entrevé una profunda analogía entre la acitvidad del poeta-creador y la acción 
divina de la Providencia. Ahora se comprende también por qué Cervantes insiste tanto en 
glorificar la poesía y por qué la pone por encima de todas las otras ciencias” (132).20 I 
would only add that the limited omniscience of Cervantes’s demiurge reflects analogous 
limits on the providential god theorized by Molina and the Jesuits. To wit, when placed 
into circulation, authorial creations/replicants take on lives of their own, and their 
evolution and meaning ultimately escape the complete control of the A/author. Preciosa 
and Andrés are cases in point, in that the occasion of their acquaintance underlines how 
unpredictable temporal existence can be, once desire comes into play. In both cases, a 
conduit is opened between the transcendental and temporal planes, and human actors 
become co-creators of the universe. 
Vicente Pérez de León has probably been the most daring critic to situate 
Cervantes within avant-garde scientific thought during the Baroque. According to his 
theoretical model in Cervantes y el cuarto misterio, Occasion would be an important 
instance of what he terms a sinculacro: 
[E]n los sinculacros la explicación de su sentido conlleva un componente puramente causal, 
al ser originados en el contexto del arte-arteficio creado por el ser humano con el propósito 
de alterar el orden de la existencia de un individuo o grupo mediante la creación de un 
poderosísimo vínculo que reproduzca cuidadosamente el efecto de una sincronicidad. (28)  
His negotiation of early modern theories of scientific acausality (primarily in the figure 
of Giordano Bruno), quantum physics, and the synchronistic philosophical program of 
the I Ching creates a provocative framework for approaching the most oft-commented 
conundrums in Cervantes’s works. Through the concept of sinculacro he is able to tease 
out the acausal substrate that inhabits scientific thought in both early and late modernity. 
For instance, it functions quite well in underlining that Preciosa’s obedience at the end of 
the La Gitanilla might be read as a continuation, and not the end, of her beguiling 
theatricality, since her silence may be motivated by the sense of perverse enjoyment that 
her father exhibits in the torture of Andrés and that her mother displays when she takes 
possession of her daughter. David Castillo and Massimo Lollini find a homologous 
incorporation of unreason into modern rationality in Giambattista Vico’s New Science:  
At the heart of Vico’s view of history, theology and poetics, one can find an inclusive 
conception of reason that re-incorporates the realm of imagination (universalis fantastici). 
His notion of “poetic imagination” allows him to recognize the importance of singularities 
out of which universality is created. (xvii)  
One such singularity follows on Preciosa’s father’s appropriation of history upon being 
reunited with his daughter. When he enters the prison to speak with Andrés, his first 
words to the lovestruck murderer are filled with both violence and enjoyment: “¿Cómo 
está la buena pieza? ¡Que así tuviera yo atraillados cuantos gitanos hay en España, para 
acabar con ellos en un día, como Nerón quisiera en Roma, sin dar más de un golpe!” 
(130). The padre-cum-verdugo’s opening words deliver a cruel joke concerning Andrés’s 
accommodations. Just in case the sadistic humor is lost on the reader, the Corregidor 
follows it up immediately with his imagined identification with the Roman Emperor Nero. 
This is an amazingly problematic comparison on a number of levels, most immediately 
because Nero’s starring role in the persecution and martyrdom of early Christians is a 
Classical commonplace. In terms of structural irony, the early modern persecution of the 
gypsies is implicitly juxtaposed to the persecution of the early Christians in Rome, 
effecting a complete role reversal.  
 Nor do the gypsies escape this structural irony, as their enjoyment of thievery 
provides a comparatively harmless foreshadowing of the Corregidor’s enjoyment of 
torture. The gypsy patriarch tells Andrés: “has de gustar dél de modo que te comas las 
manos tras él” (104). Becoming a gypsy ladrón is not only a vocation but also a source of 
pleasure, just as the Corregidor’s juridical profession becomes a source of perverse 
enjoyment. This may be the most disturbing and ideologically productive structural irony 
in the novela. It is both an irrational cause—acausality—and absolute limit on any 
‘scientific’ attempt to articulate concrete knowledge of the political and cultural 
dynamics at play in early modernity. More importantly, it moves beyond Kant’s moral 
imperative to treat the other as an end in itself by underlining that the subject is, in fact, 
other to itself. In sum, treating the other as an end in itself is the place where the subject’s 
lack of knowledge about her own identity meets up with her lack of knowledge 
concerning the other. Although she obeys the wishes of her father, Preciosa literally does 
not know herself as Constanza, thus her return to her ‘authentic identity’ becomes an act 
of pure estrangement, a return to her lack of being. 
 Returning to Montero’s novel, Pablo Nopal, the author of Bruna Husky’s 
memory-identity, is struck by the fact that he does not understand how the mind of his 
creation really works because ultimately he does not understand why the scenarios he has 
written into her identity predominate in his own. This impasse becomes the marker of 
sameness between creator and creation, as Bruna, herself, is constantly surprised by the 
insistent demands of her own materiality and the power of her emotions, even though, in 
the first case, she is a manufactured artifact (not self-creating) and, in the second, her 
emotions are often sparked by ‘false memories.’ In the first chapter of Tarrying with the 
Negative, Slavoj Žižek studies the Kantian framework at issue in this essay through 
Ridley Scott’s Bladerunner, the precursor to Montero’s novel.21 He notes that “a 
successful recollection means that, by way of organizing his life-experience into a 
consistent narrative, the hero exorcises the dark demons of his past. But in the universe of 
Bladerunner...recollection designates something incomparably more radical: the total loss 
of the hero’s symbolic identity” (12). He then goes on to point out that the Cartesian 
assumption that there is something positive ‘out there,’ beyond the symbolic trappings, is 
what Kant inexorably deconstructs through his categorical imperative: “Descartes’ error 
was precisely to confuse experiential reality with logical construction qua the real-
impossible.... One has to add that this lack of intuited content is constitutive of the I; the 
inaccessibility to the I of its own ‘kernel of being’ makes it an I” (14; emphasis not 
added). Every character in La Gitanilla demonstrates this essential lack in one fashion or 
another: Andrés cannot explain his sacrifice for Preciosa, who cannot explain where her 
own words come from, etc. Their circulation through distinct symbolic economies 
changes their value, even to themselves. 
The reader of this essay will have recognized that the main object of this inquiry 
into Spain’s relationship with the scientific revolution is quite different from the studies 
cited at the beginning of this essay. Undoubtedly, there was significant scientific activity 
in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Spain, activity that has led authors like 
Cañizares-Esguerra to claim that the scientific revolution proposed by Bacon’s New 
Atlantis was modeled on Spain’s pragmatically scientific approach to conquering and 
colonizing the New World (19). Although this view serves as an important corrective to 
received wisdom concerning Spain’s ‘limited’ role in the evolution of modern science, I 
find it limiting with respect to the complexity and internal contradictions of the scientific 
revolution, as well as for what constitutes a substantial contribution to knowledge. In 
Spain, one of the most significant legacies of philosophical, and aesthetic, thought was 
not aimed at furthering the mathematical and empiricist paradigms that would give rise to 
Newtonian physics, but rather at questioning its underlying assumptions: to wit, that one 
can capture and control the world out there through mathematical logic and technological 
advances. 
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